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One of the more familiar characters in American literature is Her-
man Melville's Bartleby, the taciturn scrivener who disrupts his em-
ployer's law office by responding to any request to perform his duties
with the enigmatic reply, "'I would prefer not to.' "1 In recent years,
some state courts have indicated that they would "prefer not to" hear
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) that seek an award of attorney's
fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976 (section
1988).2
In the past, state courts' reluctance to hear section 1983 claims did
not seriously affect parties attempting to redress violations of federal
rights by state officials, since federal courts were the preferred forum
for such suits.3 In the aftermath of Pennhurst State School & Hospital
v. Halderman,4 however, the need to resort to state courts as the forum
for federal as well as state claims has heightened the significance of
determining whether state courts are obligated to hear section 1983 ac-
tions. Although the Supreme Court held that section 1983 claims may
be brought in state courts,5 it has not defined clearly the circumstances,
if any, under which a state court may properly refuse to hear a section
1983 suit. There is some evidence that state courts will conclude that
t B.A. 1984, Lehigh University; J.D. Candidate 1987, University of Penn-
sylvania.
I Melville, Bartleby, The Scrivener, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF SHORT
FICTION 991, 993 (R. Cassill 2d ed. 1981).
2 Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)).
3 See Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1413, 1443-44 (1975) (describing lack of federal jurisdic-
tion as a drawback in suits against a state).
4 465 U.S. 89 (1984). In Pennhurst, the Supreme Court held that the eleventh
amendment prohibited federal courts from exercising pendent jurisdiction over suits
seeking to enjoin state officials from violating state law. See infra text accompanying
notes 18-30.
5 See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283-85 (1980).
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the Court's failure to mandate state jurisdiction leaves state judges with
the discretion to refuse to hear section 1983 claims.' This Comment
argues that no such discretion exists.
Part I surveys the procedural foundations of section 1983 suits and
examines the impact of the Pennhurst decision on litigation of federal
civil rights claims. Part II demonstrates that more than a century of
judicial interpretation of the supremacy clause7 obligates state courts to
hear section 1983 claims and compels them to grant the remedies, in-
cluding attorney's fees, provided in section 1988. Part III argues that
state courts cannot justify refusal to hear suits under section 1983 on
the basis of sovereign immunity or any other constitutional principle,
even in cases which could result in an attorney's fee award from a state
treasury pursuant to section 1988.
I. SECTION 1983 AND THE Pennhurst PROBLEM
To illustrate the elements involved in a suit under section 1983,
assume that a single father sues to enjoin his exclusion from a state
program authorizing financial assistance for working mothers. Arguing
that the exclusion would constitute a violation of his right to equal pro-
tection of the laws granted by the fourteenth amendment,$ the father
would have a claim under section 1983 against the state official ad-
ministering the program. The cause of action under section 1983, origi-
nally created by the Civil Rights Act of 1871,' allows suits in law and
equity against any persons, including state and local government offi-
cials, who violate federally guaranteed rights "under color of" state
law.' 0 In addition, as a result of congressional recognition that, unlike
most federal civil rights acts, section 1983 and its related sections do not
6 See Spencer v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 281 S.C. 492, 496-97, 316 S.E.2d
386, 388-89 (1984), affd, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985) (per curiam); see also Brown v.
Hornbeck, 54 Md. App. 404, 413, 458 A.2d 900, 904 (1983) (declining to address issue
whether the court was obligated to hear section 1983 claim).
7 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
8 In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975), a Social Security provi-
sion, 42 U.S.C. § 40 2(g) (1982), that provided survivor's benefits to widows but not
widowers was found to violate "the right to equal protection secured by the Fifth
Amendment."
9 Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
10 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States . .. to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
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contain attorney's fee provisions,11 section 1988 was amended to au-
thorize courts to award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing
party in a suit to enforce section 1983.12 Congress justified fee shifting
under section 1988 as follows:
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen
who must sue to enforce the law has little or no money with
which to hire a lawyer. If private citizens are to be able to
assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation's
fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, the citi-
zens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them
to vindicate these rights in court."3
Frequently the state action that is the-subject of a section 1983 suit
is also alleged to violate state law. For example, assume that in the
hypothetical suit discussed above the state's own constitution expressly
prohibits the distribution of benefits on the basis of sex. The plaintiff
would then have a strong argument that his exclusion from the pro-
gram infringes his rights under the state constitution. However, unless
state law also contained an attorney's fee provision, the plaintiff, if
forced to an election of remedies, would most likely seek relief through
a section 1983 suit, which could yield an award of attorney's fees.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Pennhurst State School
& Hospital v. Halderman,14 there was no need for a plaintiff to for-
sake a state law claim while pursuing the federal claim in federal court.
Under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, a state law claim arising
under the same "nucleus of operative fact[s]" as those of the section
1983 claim could be decided by a federal court. 5 As a result, even if
11 See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5910-13.
12 It should be noted that the amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 also provides for
attorney's fees in actions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985 and 1986. See Civil
Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified
as an amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)). Attorney's fee provisions are especially
appropriate for suits under section 1983 since a state cannot be held liable for damages,
see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974), and since state officials enjoy a
qualified good faith immunity, see, e.g., Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. Mc-
Nary, 454 U.S. 100, 115 (1981). These factors make the prospect of a damage award
too unlikely to provide adequate monetary incentive for an attorney to represent a client
in a section 1983 action.
11 S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5908, 5910.
14 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
'" See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966). Congress antici-
pated that plaintiffs in section 1983 suits would join pendent state claims when it
passed the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5908, 5912.
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the plaintiff failed to prevail on the section 1983 claim, relief could be
obtained under the state law claim without incurring the expense of
litigating a second lawsuit in state court.
In addition to allowing plaintiffs to join state and federal claims in
a federal forum, pendent jurisdiction provided federal courts with a
way to avoid deciding cases on constitutional grounds. Section 1983 liti-
gation frequently involves constitutional questions, which American
courts prefer to avoid whenever possible.16 By granting relief under
pendent state claims, federal courts avoid resolution of cases on consti-
tutional grounds. A decision on state grounds alone, however, would
appear to eliminate the basis for an attorney's fee award, since section
1988 authorizes fee awards only in suits to enforce federal claims. Con-
gress recognized this problem when section 1988 was amended. The
legislative history indicates that Congress anticipated the approach sub-
sequently adopted by the Court, which has held that as long as a plain-
tiff states a substantial claim under section 1983," a fee award is justi-
fied in cases where the plaintiff eventually prevails on a state law claim
that arises out of the same "common nucleus of operative fact[s]" as the
section 1983 claim.1 8
In 1984, however, the Supreme Court in effect discouraged the
bringing of section 1983 claims in federal courts with its decision in
Pennhurst. The case involved a suit by patients in a state institution
' See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional ques-
tion . . . if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be dis-
posed of."); see also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 159
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Brandeis' opinion in Ashwander).
1" Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 133 n.15 (1980). The substantiality test in
Maher is derived from the Supreme Court's decisions in Hagans v. Levine, 415 U.S.
528 (1974), and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
18 See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 132 n.15. In addition to the substantiality
test, two other procedural rubrics increase the probability that parties asserting their
rights under section 1983 will be able to recover attorney's fees. First, reflecting Con-
gress's concern that it would be counterproductive to force a party able to obtain relief
through settlement to proceed to final judgment merely to obtain attorney's fees, see S.
REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5908, 5912, courts, to encourage settlement whenever possible, have adopted a
standard of considering a plaintiff to have prevailed in a section 1983 suit. If a signifi-
cant issue is resolved such that the plaintiff has achieved some benefit through litiga-
tion, the plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees. See, e.g., Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316,
1318 (4th Cir. 1979).
Second, although section 1988 allows the court, at its discretion, to award the
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees as part of costs, the section also purports to
encourage the awarding of attorney's fees. Congress intended that the party seeking to
enforce rights under section 1983, if successful, "'should ordinarily recover an attor-
ney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.'" S. REP.
No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5908, 5912 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
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for the mentally retarded who alleged that their confinement in the fa-
cility violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments, federal statutory
law,"' and state law.20 While the trial court found that plaintiffs were
entitled to relief on several grounds, including the Pennsylvania Mental
Health and Mental Retardation Act,21 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, in affirming, relied primarily on the federal Develop-
mentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act.22 The Supreme
Court reversed, concluding that the federal statute relied upon by the
Third Circuit did not create any substantive rights, and remanded for
reconsideration of plaintiffs' state law claim and other federal claims,
which had been addressed by the district court but not by the circuit
court.2" On remand, the court of appeals affirmed its judgment, basing
its decision on the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retarda-
tion Act.2 The state appealed on the grounds that a holding in federal
court based on the Pennsylvania statute was prohibited by the eleventh
amendment.
The Supreme Court agreed with the state's reasoning.2 5 Noting
that the eleventh amendment is a jurisdictional bar to suits brought in
federal court against a state, it found that the district court did not have
the power to grant relief under the Pennsylvania statute.2" The Court
recognized that under Ex parte Young2 7 a suit challenging the constitu-
tionality of a state official's action does not constitute a suit against the
state, but refused to extend the Young "fiction" to a state official's vio-
lation of state law.2" Writing for the majority, Justice Powell observed
19 The plaintiffs in Pennhurst alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982), and the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1982). See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 92.
20 The alleged violations of state law in Pennhurst involved the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-
4704 (Purdon 1969). See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 92.
21 See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1322-
23 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affid in part, rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc),
rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
22 See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 95-103 (3d
Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
21 See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18, 30-31
(1981).
2 See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647, 651-54 (3d
Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
21 See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 97.
2 See id. at 124-25.
27 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In Ex parte Young, the Court concluded that the eleventh
amendment did not prevent federal courts from enjoining enforcement of unconstitu-
tional state statutes. The Court reasoned that an unconstitutional state law is void, so
that the officer seeking to enforce the law is "stripped of his official or representative
character." Id. at 160.
28 See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 105-06.
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that "it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty
than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform
their conduct to state law." 9 Since such a suit would not come within
the Young exception to state sovereign immunity in federal court, the
Court held that the eleventh amendment barred from federal court a
claim alleging violation of state law, even when pendent to a federal
claim properly before a federal court.30
While Pennhurst did not involve a suit under section 1983, the
decision affects litigants attempting to assert their rights under that
statute. Plaintiffs who claim relief against a state official under both
state law and section 1983 can no longer bring a single action in federal
court. Pennhurst places many parties in the difficult position of having
to litigate two suits: one in federal court under section 1983 (which
would include a claim for attorney's fees), and, if the plaintiff does not
obtain satisfactory relief in federal court, a second in state court under
state law. Furthermore, lacking the option of deciding cases on pendent
state law claims, federal courts in section 1983 actions often will reach
the constitutional merits of cases that otherwise might be decided on
state statutory grounds.
Plaintiffs could mitigate most problems posed by the Pennhurst
decision by bringing their section 1983 actions with their state law ac-
tions in state courts. State courts, however, may resist enforcing the
rights and granting the remedies, including fee awards, provided by the
federal statute when the federal statute conflicts with the rights and
remedies provided by state law. This Comment will attempt to show
that a state court cannot refuse to enforce the provisions of section 1983
and section 1988 when it exercises jurisdiction over a state law action
arising out of the same fact situation.
II. STATE COURTS' OBLIGATION TO HEAR SECTION 1983 CLAIMS
At first glance it might seem peculiar to advocate state courts as a
forum for the protection of federal rights, but the supremacy clause
compels state courts to protect the rights granted by the Constitution
and laws of the United States.31 Before a state court can be required to
hear a section 1983 claim, concurrent jurisdiction under federal law
and jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of the suit must
29 Id. at 106.
30 See id. at 121. The Supreme Court remanded to the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit to determine whether relief could be granted on other grounds. See id. at
124-25.
31 See infra text accompanying notes 32-51.
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exist. This section will argue that once these jurisdictional elements are
established, conflicts with state substantive or remedial law do not jus-
tify a state court's refusal to protect the rights and enforce the remedies
provided by section 1983 and section 1988.
A. Concurrent State Jurisdiction Over Section 1983 Claims.
As long ago as 1876, in Claflin v. Houseman,"2 the Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff could pursue a claim brought under a fed-
eral statute in state court. Justice Bradley spoke for a unanimous court:
Every citizen of a state is a subject of two distinct sovereign-
ties, having concurrent jurisdiction in the State,-concurrent
as to place and persons, though distinct as to subject-matter.
Legal or equitable rights, acquired under either system of
laws, may be enforced in any court of either sovereignty
competent to hear and determine such kind of rights and not
restrained by its constitution in the exercise of such
jurisdiction. 3
The Court suggested in Claflin that the supremacy clause, which binds
state judges to recognize and support federal law, also compels them to
hear federal claims in state courts:
The fact that a State court derives its existence and functions
from the State laws is no reason why it should not afford
relief; because it is subject also to the laws of the United
States, and is just as much bound to recognize these as oper-
ative within the State as it is to recognize the State laws.3"
In the Second Employers' Liability Cases, 5 the Court clarified the
obligation of state courts to exercise jurisdiction over federal claims by
holding that state courts must provide a forum for actions arising under
the Federal Employers Liability Act. 6 The defendant had argued that
the state court need not provide a forum for claims arising under the
act, since the act conflicted with Connecticut law.37 The Court found
that a state court has a duty "when its ordinary jurisdiction as pre-
scribed by local laws is appropriate to the occasion and is invoked in
conformity with those laws, to take cognizance of an action to enforce a
32 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
3' Id. at 136.
34 Id. at 137.
- 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
" See id. at 56-59.
-1 See id. at 15-16, 57.
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right of civil recovery arising under the act of Congress."38 In Testa v.
Katt,3 9 the Court, following the Second Employers' Liability Cases, de-
cided that a state court must address a federal claim when the court has
jurisdiction to adjudicate the same type of claim under state law."0
Not every congressional act can be enforced in state courts; Con-
gress frequently has exercised the power to confer exclusive jurisdiction
upon federal courts."' However, absent a finding of congressional intent
to prevent state courts from hearing a federally created claim, state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the federal claim. For example,
in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,"2 the Supreme Court inter-
preted section 301(e) of the Labor Management Relations Act,"3 which
states that suits "may be brought in any district court of the United
States," as permitting concurrent state jurisdiction, since Congress cast
the right to bring suit in federal court in permissive rather than
mandatory language."" Accordingly, with respect to a statute that ex-
pressly provided for concurrent state jurisdiction, the Court recognized
that the statute, rather than creating state court jurisdiction, merely rec-
ognized that state courts already possessed jurisdiction.45
Although section 1983 contains no provisions regarding jurisdic-
tion, the relevant jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3),46 pro-
vides for original, but not exclusive, federal court jurisdiction. Because
section 1983 does not evidence an intent to exclude state court jurisdic-
tion, the Dowd analysis suggests that state courts have concurrent juris-
diction to hear claims under section 1983. In several state courts, it has
been argued that Congress intended to create exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 4 the statute that preceded
38 Id. at 56-57.
39 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
40 Id. at 394.
41 See, e.g., L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIEs REGULATION 1016 & n.4
(1983) (noting that, unlike most federal securities statutes, the Securities Exchange Act
provides for exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts).
42 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
,3 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
" See Dowd, 368 U.S. at 506-08.
48 See Second Employers' Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. at 56.
46 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982) states:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person: . . . (3) To redress
the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for
equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States.
47 See Terry v. Kolski, 78 Wis. 2d 475, 502-04, 254 N.W.2d 704, 715-16 (1977)
(Hansen, J., dissenting) (arguing that since the Civil Rights Act of 1871 had its own
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section 1983. The Tennessee Supreme Court held, in Chamberlain v.
Brown, that state courts are barred from hearing section 1983 claims.48
Other state courts, however, have not found the reasoning in Chamber-
lain persuasive and have exercised jurisdiction over section 1983
suits.49 In 1980, instead of following Chamberlain, the United States
Supreme Court rejected an argument that jurisdiction to hear section
1983 suits rests exclusively with federal courts.50 State courts cannot
rely on Chamberlain in refusing to hear section 1983 suits; the asser-
tion that state courts are barred from entertaining claims under section
1983 is no longer plausible.5 '
B. Discretionary Grounds for Refusing Jurisdiction
Over Section 1983 Claims
State courts that refuse to hear claims under section 1983 justify
their discretion on the grounds that the Supreme Court, in Martinez v.
California,52 did not hold that state courts are obligated to hear such
claims. 53 Although the Court in Martinez explicitly refrained from
holding that state courts must hear section 1983 claims, it qualified its
position by noting, "[Wihere the same type of claim, if arising under
state law, would be enforced in the state courts, the state courts are
jurisdictional section that provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction, the "original juris-
diction" language in § 1343(a)(3) is the result of the clerical process of separating the
substantive and jurisdictional provisions of the act in the Revised Statutes of 1874 and
codifying the provisions in different titles of the United States Code, and is not attribu-
table to congressional intent to allow concurrent state jurisdiction). But see id. at 488-
90, 254 N.W.2d at 708-09 (rejecting Justice Hansen's argument on the grounds that
since the Revised Statutes of 1874 were intended to repeal all prior public acts, the
provisions of the 1874 act, which are substantially identical to § 1343(a)(3), determine
whether concurrent jurisdiction exists.
41 223 Tenn. 25, 35, 442 S.W.2d 248, 252 (1969). In rejecting concurrent juris-
diction of section 1983 claims, the Tennessee Supreme Court analyzed the historical
motivation behind the enactment of what has become 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Relying on
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-87 (1961), in which the Supreme Court discussed
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the court reasoned that since the
Civil Rights Act purported to provide access to federal courts to litigants whose rights
might be jeopardized by bias or neglect in state courts, "[i]t would be illogical indeed to
hold that a State court should enforce, or is required to enforce, an alleged cause of
action which owes its very existence to congressional recognition of reluctance or refusal
of State courts to act." Chamberlain, 223 Tenn. at 35, 442 S.W.2d at 252.
4 See Kristensen v. Strinden, 343 N.W.2d 67, 70 (N.D. 1983) ("[E]very state
court that has considered the Chamberlain decision has rejected its reasoning in favor
of exercising jurisdiction in § 1983 actions."); Terry, 78 Wis. 2d at 481, 254 N.W.2d
at 711 (citing cases rejecting the reasoning in Chamberlain).
50 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1980):
51 See id.; Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980).
52 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
53 See supra text accompanying note 5.
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generally not free to refuse enforcement of the federal claim.""
The Court supported this proposition by citing Testa v. Katt.55
Testa established that a state court cannot refuse to hear a federal claim
over which it has concurrent jurisdiction if it would hear the same type
of claim arising under state law.5" The state court must offer a forum
for the federal claim, regardless of whether state law conflicts with the
federal law being litigated. The Court noted in Second Employers' Lia-
bility Cases,
The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in har-
mony with the policy of the State, and therefore that the
courts of the State are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite
inadmissible, because it presupposes what in legal contem-
plation does not exist. . . . Congress, in the exertion of the
power confided to it by the Constitution . . . spoke for all
the people and all the States, and thereby established a pol-
icy for all. That policy is as much the policy of [the state] as
if the act had emanated from its own legislature, and should
be respected accordingly in the courts of the State.57
The invocation of Testa by the Court in Martinez suggests that a
state court's discretion to refuse to hear section 1983 claims is no
greater than its discretion to decline jurisdiction over other federal
claims.
With few exceptions, a state court must entertain a federal claim
over which it has concurrent jurisdiction. The decision in Second Em-
ployers' Liability Cases demonstrates that state courts cannot refuse ju-
risdiction over federal claims because of conflict with state substantive
law.5" Even when the federal suit appears to be barred by a local rule
of procedure, a state court can still be compelled to adjudicate. For ex-
ample, in McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railway,59 Alabama
refused jurisdiction over a claim under the Federal Employers Liability
Act (FELA) on the ground that an Alabama statute provided for state
court jurisdiction only over claims involving common law or the statutes
of another state.60 Since the claim invoked neither the common law nor
a statute of another state, Alabama argued that its local procedural
"' Martinez, 444 U.S. at 283-84 n.7 (citing Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394
(1947)).
55 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
56 Testa, 330 U.S. at 394.
57 Second Employers' Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. at 57.
58 Id.
59 292 U.S. 230 (1934).
11 See id. at 231-32.
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rules prevented an Alabama state court from hearing the federal claim.
The Supreme Court found the Alabama statute unconstitutional as ap-
plied; a state may not discriminate against a claim "solely because the
suit is brought under a federal law."'"
Dice v. Akron, Canton, & Youngstown Railroad2 exemplifies the
extent to which state courts are compelled to hear federal claims. In
Dice, the Supreme Court reversed the Ohio state court decision, which
deprived a plaintiff in a case under the Federal Employers Liability
Act of the right under the statute to have all questions of fact submitted
to the jury.6 3 Ohio law requires judges to decide the existence of certain
types of fraud.64 However, the Supreme Court found that under the
FELA:
"The right to trial by jury is .. .part and parcel of
the remedy afforded railroad workers under the Employer
Liability Act." . .. It follows that the right to trial by jury
is too substantial a part of the rights accorded by the Act to
permit it to be classified as a mere "local rule of procedure"
for denial in the manner that Ohio has here used. 5
The few cases in which the Supreme Court has upheld a state
court's decision not to hear a claim arising under a federal statute in-
volved situations where the courts would have refused to hear the
plaintiffs' claims even if they had been brought under state law. In
Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad,66 the Court
upheld a New York court's refusal to adjudicate a claim under the
FELA. The substantive and remedial provisions of the act were not at
issue; instead, the New York court claimed that it did not have to pro-
vide a forum for a nonresident plaintiff suing a foreign corporation
with regard to events not occurring, in New York.6' A New York stat-
ute, intended to afford the state's courts some measure of docket control,
gave New York judges discretionary jurisdiction over claims by nonresi-
dents against foreign corporations. 8 Since this statute applied to all
claims raised by nonresidents, including suits brought under New York
law, the Supreme Court found that the New York statute did not dis-
61 Id. at 233-34.
62 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
63 Id. at 363-64.
Id. at 363.
65 Id. (quoting Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943)) (citing
Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1949)).
66 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
17 See id. at 382-83.
68 See id. at 385.
19861
1218 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
criminate against federal claims."9 Similarly, in Missouri ex. rel. South-
ern Railway v. Mayfield,7" the Court concluded that a state court could
refuse jurisdiction over a federal claim under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.
71
C. State Court Refusal to Grant Federal Remedies
Once a state court has concurrent jurisdiction over the parties and
events involved in a federal cause of action, the court appears obligated
to provide a forum for the federal claim. However, at least one state
court has argued that since state law does not permit awarding of attor-
ney's fees, it need not hear federal claims brought pursuant to provi-
sions such as section 1983 that include the awarding of attorney's fees
as an "integral part" of the federal statutory scheme.7 1 In Spencer v.
South Carolina Tax Commission,73 the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina declared that "[s]tate remedies for asserting rights may not be cir-
cumvented by invoking section 1983.2'" The court held that a state
statute prohibiting the assessment of costs in the plaintiff's state law
action excused the court from hearing the plaintiff's related federal
claim.7 5 The decision exaggerates both the role that the availability of
69 See id. at 387.
70 340 U.S. 1 (1950).
7'1 See id. at 5. The Court held that a state may refuse to hear a federal claim "if
in similar cases the State for reasons of local policy denies resort to its courts and
enforces its policy impartially." Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
11 See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5912-13.
73 281 S.C. 492, 316 S.E.2d 386 (1984), affd, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985) (per
curiam).
74 Id. at 497, 316 S.E.2d at 389 (citing Backus v. Chivilis, 236 Ga. 500, 505-06,
224 S.E.2d 370, 374-75 (1976)).
75 Id. at 497, 316 S.E.2d at 388-89. The decision in Spencer should, at most, be
read as limited to its facts. The dispute dealt with a state tax statute. In 1937, Congress
passed the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982), which prohibits federal
courts from granting injunctions in cases involving imposition of state taxes as long as
"plain, speedy and efficient" relief is available through the state court system. Although
the act concerns only injunctions, the Supreme Court has found that the principle of
comity, which underlies section 1341, also requires prohibition of state tax suits in
federal courts for refunds of unconstitutional taxes, see First Nat'l Bank v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 264 U.S. 450, 456 (1924), declaratory judgments in state tax suits,
see Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943); see also California v. Grace
Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408 (1982) (holding that a district court did not have
jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act to issue "a declaratory judgment holding
state tax laws unconstitutional"), and damage suits against state tax officials under
section 1983, see Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 199
(1981). Since the Tax Injunction Act seeks to limit federal interference with the collec-
tion of state taxes, and reflects the assumption that state courts are unlikely to interfere,
see S. REP. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937), and that the pay-under-protest
remedies provided by states such as South Carolina are satisfactory, id., it can be ar-
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state remedies plays in determining state court jurisdiction over federal
claims and the discretion that state courts have to refuse to provide fed-
eral remedies once jurisdiction has been established.
The failure of state law explicitly to authorize state courts to pro-
vide the remedies available under federal law does not justify a state
court's refusal to hear a federal claim. The Court in Testa noted that
"the obligation of states to enforce these federal laws is not lessened by
reason of the form in which they are cast or the remedy which they
provide."76 In addition, allowing a state court to refuse jurisdiction be-
cause the state ordinarily does not extend a remedy available under a
federal claim would conflict with the principles that obligate state
courts to enforce federal claims. The line of cases from Claflin to Sec-
ond Employers' Liability Cases to Testa supports the conclusion that
state courts must treat most federal claims as if they arose from statutes
enacted by the state's own legislature. When confronted with a federal
cause of action that requests a certain remedy, a state judge should not
ask: "Does existing state law link the remedy to a similar state cause of
action?" Instead, the state judge should inquire: "Would I have the
power to grant the remedy if state law had made it available for claims
similar to the federal claim?"
Finally, a state court's limitation of concurrent jurisdiction to
claims that seek remedies available under state law would inhibit the
operation of federal statutes motivated by dissatisfaction with existing
state remedies." For example, section 301(e) of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act resulted in part from a belief among some members
of Congress that state remedies against labor unions in contract dis-
putes were inadequate. 8 The Supreme Court has held that state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to hear claims under section 301(e).7 ' To
gued that section 1983, which Congress enacted prior to the Tax Injunction Act, should
not be read to authorize interference with state procedures and remedies Congress sub-
sequently deemed satisfactory when it passed the Tax Injunction Act. Since Spencer
was affirmed per curiam, the Supreme Court did not indicate its reasons for endorsing
the South Carolina decision. Any explanation other than deference to state tax proce-
dures, however, would involve some measure of Court approval of the Spencer state
court's problematic section 1983 and 1988 analysis, the flaws of which this section of
the Comment discusses.
76 330 U.S. at 391.
7 In the related context of determining the extent of governmental immunities, see
Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on Section 1988,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 607 (1985) ("There is, moreover, some incongruity in sug-
gesting that a statute adopted to redress a failure of existing legal remedies for viola-
tions of constitutional rights should be defined by the scope of those very remedies.")
(footnote omitted).
78 See Dowd, 368 U.S. at 510-13.
7 Id. at 506.
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limit state courts hearing such suits to state remedies would frustrate
congressional intent.
Most of the state courts that have considered the issue have deter-
mined that the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction does not depend on
the state remedies available for a state claim similar to the federal
claim. For example, in Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners,0 the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin found that a state law limiting the tort
liability of municipalities did not bar actions in Wisconsin courts under
section 1983:
[S]tate law cannot be used where its application would frus-
trate federal policies. The policy behind section 1983 civil
rights actions is one of compensation for actual injury. Inso-
far as the state recovery ceiling prevents realization of that
policy, it must give way. We conclude that the limitation on
municipal liability set forth in [a state statute] has no appli-
cation to a damage award under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1
The supreme courts of at least three other states have reached similar
conclusions."2
The United States Supreme Court has also declined to attach any
jurisdictional significance to the availability of specified remedies under
state law. In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,"3 for example, the
Court held that the injunctive relief provided by section 1988 could be
granted in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 19824 by any state court with eq-
uitable power.8 5 When the same question arose pursuant to a section
1983 claim in Martinez v. California,"8 the Court observed:
" 'Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which
is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985(3) cannot be
immunized by state law. A construction of the federal statute
which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling
effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory
promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution in-
sures that the proper construction may be enforced.' "87
80 115 Wis. 2d 289, 340 N.W.2d 704 (1983).
81 Id. at 304, 340 N.W.2d at 711.
82 See Coalition for Economic Survival v. Deukmejian, 171 Cal. App. 3d 954, 217
Cal. Rptr. 621 (1985); Thiboutot v. Maine, 405 A.2d 230 (Me. 1979), affd, 448 U.S.
1 (1980); Gomez v. Board of Educ. 85 N.M. 708, 516 P.2d 679 (1973).
88 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
84 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982).
88 Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 238.
86 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
17 Id. at 284 n.8 (quoting Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973),
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A few months later, in Maine v. Thiboutot,8a the Court upheld a sec-
tion 1988 award of attorney's fees in a section 1983 suit although
Maine law made no provision for awarding fees or costs for similar
state claims. The Court concluded in Thiboutot that "the fee provision
is a part of the section 1983 remedy whether the action is brought in
federal or state court." 9 Under the Martinez and Thiboutot decisions
state remedies appear to be irrelevant in defining a state court's juris-
diction to hear section 1983 claims.90 Once a state court establishes ju-
risdiction over a federal claim, it may apply a federal remedy not avail-
able under state law. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Garrett v.
Moore-McCormack Co.,"' state courts are "bound to proceed in such
manner that all the substantial rights of the parties under controlling
federal law would be protected."9 2 Since the attorney's fee provision of
section 1988 is considered essential to the enforcement of the substan-
tive provisions of section 1983," the two sections are effectively one
statute that state courts must enforce in its entirety.
III. FEDERAL ABROGATION OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
As the above section shows, state courts have concurrent jurisdic-
tion to hear section 1983 suits; conflict with existing state law does not
justify refusal to entertain a section 1983 suit. In addition, the obliga-
tion to hear section 1983 claims carries with it the obligation to enforce
remedies provided in section 1988; the lack of availability of attorney's
fees under similar state statutes does not excuse a state court's refusal of
jurisdiction over section 1983 suits. Plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief
and attorney's fees from a state must consider, however, the state's sov-
ereign immunity. A state unwilling to submit to a section 1983 and
section 1988 suit in its own courts may argue that whatever power
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974) (quoting McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 290
(7th Cir. 1968))).
88 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
89 Id. at 11.
90 But cf. supra note 75 (regarding the unavailability of injunctions in section
1983 suits challenging state taxes). A strong argument can be made, however, for re-
quiring state courts to hear section 1983 suits for tax refunds. See Note, Section 1983
in State Court: A Remedy for Unconstitutional State Taxation, 95 YALE L.J. 414
(1985); see also Bung's Bar & Grille, Inc. v. Township of Florence, 206 N.J. Super.
432, 457-62, 502 A.2d 1198, 1213-16 (1985) (awarding attorney's fees under section
1988 on the grounds that the Tax Injunction Act does not deprive state courts of juris-
diction over section 1983 tax suits).
91 317 U.S. 239 (1942) (involving a suit by a seaman in state court for damages
under the federal Merchant Marine Act).
92 Id. at 245.
93 See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5908, 5912-13.
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Congress has to empower state courts to hear claims against private
parties and state government officers and entities, the relationship be-
tween a state government and its judiciary is entirely a matter of state
concern. According to this argument, it would violate the central princi-
ple of sovereign immunity-a sovereign cannot be sued in its own court
without its consent 94-for Congress to pass a law that forces a state to
submit to the authority of its own courts against its will.
A. Sovereign Immunity in State Courts:
Constitutional Considerations
A state's sovereign immunity is not absolute. For example, in Fitz-
patrick v. Bitzer,9 5 the Supreme Court held without dissent that Con-
gress has the power under the fourteenth amendment to provide for
private suits against states on federal claims in federal court.9" Con-
gress, however, can force a state court to hear a suit against the state
only if it can require the state court to hear a federally created cause of
action and can abrogate any sovereign immunity defense a state could
otherwise raise in its own court.
The discussion in Part II clarifies that the congressional creation
of a cause of action, unless accompanied by a vesting of exclusive juris-
diction in the federal courts, gives rise to an obligation of state courts to
provide a forum for the federal claim. Under the Court's present inter-
pretation of state sovereignty in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,97 such congressional action causes no constitutional
problem, since state sovereignty concerns permeate the institutional in-
fluence of the states on Congress's decision to create a cause of action. 98
Even under the more restrictive, and now rejected, standard established
in National League of Cities v. Usery,99 the requirement that state
"' See Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages
Against States in Their Own Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CALIF. L. REv.
189, 246 (1981).
95 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
98 See id. at 456. Justices Brennan and Stevens filed separate concurring opinions.
Justice Brennan claimed that the eleventh amendment "bars only federal court suits
against States by citizens of other states," id. at 457, and that the states surrendered
their common law sovereign immunity "at least insofar as the States granted Congress
specifically enumerated powers," id. at 458 (citation omitted). Justice Stevens asserted
that imposition of a suit against the state could be justified because the eleventh amend-
ment "does not bar an action against state officers enforcing an invalid statute," id. at
459 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)), and because damages
would not be awarded directly from state funds, see id. at 459-60 (distinguishing
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)).
07 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
9 See id. at 1018.
426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
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courts exercise jurisdiction over a cause of action created by Congress
probably would not interfere with a state's ability to structure "integral
operations in areas of governmental functions."'100 In Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi [F.E.R.C.],'0' the Supreme
Court concluded that a statute mandating the resolution of disputes
arising under a federal utility regulation statute by a state administra-
tive tribunal did not violate state sovereignty."0 2 The Court found that
"the statute and the implementing regulations simply require the Mis-
sissippi authorities to adjudicate disputes arising under the statute. Dis-
pute resolution of this kind is the very type of activity customarily en-
gaged in by the Mississippi Public Service Commission."'0 3 The Court
cited Testa v. Katt'0 4 as instructive and controlling authority regarding
the obligation of the Mississippi tribunal to hear the federal claim.' 0 5
Accordingly, before a court could declare congressional imposition of a
cause of action on state courts unconstitutional, it would have to over-
turn Garcia and F.E.R.C., and abandon or distinguish the interpreta-
tion of the supremacy clause endorsed in Testa.
At first glance, the discussion in the preceding two paragraphs ap-
pears to dispose of the question of whether Congress can make a state
liable in actions in its own courts. If under Testa and Garcia Congress
can require state courts to hear federal claims, a state appears to have
no basis for arguing that a state court may decline to hear a federal
claim under which the state or its officers must answer to the state
court. A state could justify such an argument only if its right to refuse
to be called into its own courts against its will were recognized under
the Constitution.'0 6
B. State Sovereign Immunity Beyond the Eleventh Amendment:
A Search for a Constitutional Foundation
Most discussions about the constitutionality of a state's sovereign
immunity focus on the eleventh amendment, which provides that "the
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of
Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
100 Id. at 852.
101 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
10 See id. at 760-61.
101 Id. at 760.
104 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
105 See F.E.R.C., 456 U.S. at 760.
108 See Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doc-
trines, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 536-39 (1978).
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any foreign state." ' 7 However, the eleventh amendment is irrelevant in
the context of suits against the state in state court, since it limits only
federal court jurisdiction. While language in some cases supports a
state's sovereign immunity in state courts under the eleventh amend-
ment,108 Supreme Court justices on both sides of the current debate
over the boundaries of the eleventh amendment' 09 generally agree that
the amendment does not restrict the jurisdiction of state courts.
For example, in Maine v. Thiboutot"O the Court held that state
courts may award attorney's fees in section 1983 actions.' Justice
Brennan observed, "No Eleventh Amendment question is present, of
course, where an action is brought in a state court since the Amend-
ment, by its terms, restrains only '[tihe Judicial power of the United
States.' "112 While this comment by a leader of the fight to reduce the
scope of the eleventh amendment 3 might not constitute sufficient au-
thority to render the eleventh amendment inapplicable to state court
jurisdiction, Justice Powell, the author of two recent opinions defending
the vitality of the eleventh amendment, concurs with Justice Brennan.
In his majority opinions in both Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman11 4 and Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,1 5 Justice
Powell carefully limits his discussion of the eleventh amendment to its
effects on suits against a state in federal court."16 A state court seeking
constitutional justification for its right to refuse suits against the state
107 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
108 See Wolcher, supra note 94, at 235 & n.192 (citing cases).
109 Green v. Mansour, 106 S. Ct. 423 (1985), Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985), and Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89 (1984), are recent 5-4 decisions concerning the scope of the eleventh amendment.
110 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
111 See id. at 10-11.
112 Id. at 9 n.7 (quoting U.S. CONsT. amend. XI).
113 See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 106 S. Ct. 423, 429 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3150 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 125 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411
U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114 465 U.S. 89 (1985).
110 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985).
118 See id. at 3147 ("[I1n order for a state statute or constitutional provision to
constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must specify the State's inten-
tion to subject itself to suit infederal court.") (citation omitted); id. at 3146 n.2 (" 'The
issue is not the general immunity of the States from private suit . . . but merely the
susceptibility of the States to suit before federal tribunals.' ") (quoting Employees v.
Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 293-94 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
concurring)) (emphasis added in Atascadero); Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 120 ("[The elev-
enth amendment] is a specific constitutional bar against hearing even federal claims
that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.") (citation
omitted).
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cannot rely on the eleventh amendment.
At least one commentator has suggested the existence of an implied
state's right to immunity from suit in its own court, 117 and some lan-
guage in the Court's opinions comports with this view." 8 A proper
evaluation of this somewhat nebulous claim requires closer examination
of how the Constitution resolves the problem of subjecting the sovereign
authority of the states to the sovereign authority of the federal
government.
When the representatives of the individual states negotiated the
terms of the Constitution, they represented entities that possessed all
the characteristics of sovereign states, including sovereign immunity at
common law. The issue of what powers the states retained following
the ratification of the Constitution has sparked debate for almost two
centuries. The federal government certainly assumed the role of sover-
eign over the new nation. There is also no doubt that the Constitution
did not explicitly abrogate the states' immunity from suit in their own
courts; even today a state court cannot compel its own state government
to appear in court without the state government's consent or acquies-
cence." 9 Questions remain, however, regarding the extent to which sov-
ereign immunity survived. By its very nature a common law doctrine
such as sovereign immunity is subject to alteration by the judiciary or
the legislature of the sovereign, and the legislature can override un-
wanted judicial interpretations of the common law through statutes or
constitutional amendments. Prior to 1789, state legislatures were the
ultimate guardians of the states' common law immunity. The ratifica-
tion of the Constitution, however, subjected the states to a new sover-
eign's courts and a new sovereign's legislature. Since the sovereign can
modify the common law, a state's immunity from suit without its con-
sent would be subject to any alteration which Congress has power to
legislate, unless the Constitution protects the state's immunity.
Since article I does not limit Congress's ability to diminish the
states' sovereign immunity, any restriction on the federal government's
power to subject a state to suit must emanate from article III, which
defines the judicial power relinquished by the states to the federal gov-
ernment. Although article III addresses only the power of federal
courts, the Constitutional Convention considered the issue of state sov-
117 See Wolcher, supra note 94, at 246-47; see also Field, supra note 106, at 517
(comparing a hypothetical constitutional source of state sovereign immunity with the
unstated source of the federal government's sovereign immunity).
118 See Field, supra note 106, at 548 (citing cases).
119 See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1043 (5th ed. 1984).
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ereign immunity in adopting article III.2'
Section 2 of article III states:
The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of
the United States . . . ;-to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between
two or more States; - between a State and Citizens of an-
other State;-between Citizens of different States . . . and
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens, or Subjects.121
Some delegates to the Constitutional Convention interpreted this lan-
guage as preserving the states' sovereign immunity. In the Virginia de-
bates, John Marshall focused on the "State and Citizens of another
State" language:
I hope that no gentleman will think that a state will be
called at the bar of the federal court. . . . It is not rational
to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged
before a court. The intent is to enable states to recover
claims of individuals residing in other states. I contend this
construction is warranted by the words. But, say that, there
will be partiality in it if a state cannot be defendant-if an
individual cannot proceed to obtain a judgment against a
state, though he may be sued by a state. It is necessary to be
so, and cannot be avoided.' 22
Other delegates interpreted the same language as providing a right
for citizens of one state to sue another state. For example, the imparti-
ality of the Constitution impressed James Wilson, since it established
"a tribunal where both [a state and a citizen] may stand on a just and
equal footing." '123 Some commentators, less enthralled with the prospect
of a citizen suing a state in federal court, did not share Wilson's inter-
pretation of article III. The New York convention recommended an
amendment that would have provided that the Constitution "not be
construed to authorize any suit to be brought against any state, in any
manner." '124 Such an amendment, if accepted, would have embodied
120 See Nowak, supra note 3, at 1422-30.
121 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
122 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 555-56 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S
DEBATES].
123 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 122, at 491.
124 Id. at 409.
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constitutional recognition of states' substantive sovereign immunity.
The delegates did not adopt the New York amendment, however, indi-
cating that they chose to deal with the issue of suits against the states as
a jurisdictional, rather than a substantive, problem.
The furor surrounding the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm
v. Georgia1 25 lends support to the notion that only a state's immunity
from suits brought by its own citizens in federal court enjoys constitu-
tional protection. In Chisholm, the Supreme Court read article III lit-
erally and heard a case in which a South Carolina citizen sued the state
of Georgia.1 26 Some judicial commentators, including the first Justice
Harlan, considered Chisholm to interpret the Constitution correctly;
27
at least some states, however, did not anticipate the result in Chisholm
when they surrendered their sovereignty in the Constitution. For exam-
ple, the Georgia legislature enacted a provision specifying that anyone
attempting to collect on the debts in Chisholm would be "guilty of a
felony and shall suffer death, without benefit of clergy, by being
hanged.11 28 The third Congress, exercising a little more restraint, be-
gan the process of reversing the heresy of the court in Chisholm by
constitutional amendment.
The Chisholm decision afforded the states a perfect opportunity to
write into the Constitution an affirmative right not to be sued without
their consent. Instead, they cast their disapproval of the Chisholm deci-
sion in jurisdictional language. While the language of the eleventh
amendment repudiates the interpretation of article III in Chisholm, it
does not convey an affirmative grant of sovereign immunity to the
states.1 29 This is important, because a state court can justify a refusal to
hear a federal claim against the state only if the power to subject the
state to potential liability was constitutionally denied to the federal gov-
ernment.1 30 Article III and the eleventh amendment preclude any in-
125 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
126 See id.
127 See Field, supra note 106, at 516 n.3.
128 See id. at 536 n.78.
129 See id. at 540-41.
"0 Even if a state's sovereign immunity is of constitutional magnitude, such im-
munity might not extend to a state court's refusal to hear a suit under section 1983 and
section 1988. Both provisions were enacted pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, and the same reasoning that justified the abrogation of eleventh amend-
ment immunity in federal court in Fitzpatrick and Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678
(1978), see Comment, Civil Rights Attorney Fees in Cases Resolved on State Pendent
and Federal Statutory Grounds, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 488 (1981), would appear to
justify the abrogation of any constitutional sovereign immunity defense raised in state
court. One commentator has observed that:
If there is an implied constitutional doctrine giving states sovereign immu-
nity from monetary liability in their own courts, one would have expected
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trusion on sovereign immunity by the federal courts, but are silent as to
the power of the federal legislature to abrogate a state's sovereign im-
munity in state courts.
C. State Sovereign Immunity as a Common Law Doctrine
Since state sovereign immunity began as a common law doctrine
and neither article III nor the eleventh amendment grants the states an
affirmative constitutional right to avoid being haled into court against
their will, the right of states to refuse to defend suits brought without
their consent apparently maintains common law status. Professor Field
recognizes the common law status of state sovereign immunity in her
article The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doc-
trines.131 While Field's article focuses primarily on the basis for state
sovereign immunity in federal courts, her analysis is useful in evaluat-
ing states' sovereign immunity in their own courts. 32
The language of article III and the wording of the eleventh
amendment do not detract from a common law theory of substantive
sovereign immunity. As previously mentioned, states' common laws are
subject to alteration by both the state courts and the state legislatures.
The subordination of state law to federal law by the supremacy clause
also subjects the states' common law to alteration by Congress and the
federal courts. In numerous instances, federal legislation has modified
state common law doctrines. For example, in Dice v. Akron, Canton &
Youngstown Railroad'33 the Supreme Court found that Ohio's com-
mon law allocation of the determination of fraud to the judge must
yield to the allocation to the jury endorsed in the Federal Employees
Liability Act. Similarly, the common law prohibitions of suits against
the Court [in Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980)] to analyze whether
Congress could constitutionally remove that immunity by enacting legisla-
tion under article I or any other portion of the Constitution. That it did
not do so implies either that no such immunity doctrine exists, or that it is
so clearly subject to congressional modification as not to warrant
discussion.
Wolcher, supra note 94, at 259. This Comment argues that a state's right not to be
sued in its own courts is not of constitutional magnitude.
131 Field, supra note 106, at 538.
132 See id. at 546. While Professor Field's analysis of the basis for sovereign im-
munity is in some ways even more limited than the analysis of Justice Brennan, who
also advocates a common law theory of state sovereign immunity, see id. at 539, her
view comes closest to providing a coherent explanation for Justice Marshall's proposi-
tion in Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, (1973)
adopted by Justice Powell in Atascadero, that state courts can hear federal suits barred
from federal courts by the eleventh amendment. See supra note 115 and accompanying
text.
133 342 U.S. 359, 362-64 (1952).
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organizations such as labor unions in Charles Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney' and suits awarding attorney's fees as in Maine v.
Thiboutot3 5 were deemed impotent in the- face of conflicting federal
statutes.
Under a common law theory of sovereign immunity, the state
courts, the state legislatures, the federal courts, and Congress may limit
a state's sovereign immunity. The state courts and the state legislatures
are unlikely to restrict such immunity. The state legislature could re-
verse any state court abrogation of sovereign immunity, and, by defini-
tion, could not remove the state's immunity without its consent. A state
need not rely on constitutional affirmation of sovereign immunity for
protection from its own courts or legislature.
In contrast, a federal court holding a state liable would not be
subject to correction by the state's legislature. The eleventh amendment
was intended to prevent restriction of a state's sovereign immunity by
federal courts."" The grant of judicial authority to the federal courts in
article III carefully excludes cases between a state and the state's own
citizens in which a federal court could modify the state's sovereign im-
munity. The eleventh amendment promptly eliminated the power ex-
tended to the federal judiciary in Chisholm to hear disputes between a
state and citizens of another state.1 7 Functionally, the jurisdictional
language in article III and the eleventh amendment eliminate the au-
thority of the federal courts to meddle with a state's sovereign immu-
nity on their own initiative.
No such elaborate scheme of constitutional protection shields a
state's sovereignty from interference by the federal legislature.' If the
Constitution had been intended to insulate a state's sovereign immunity
from any federal modification, the delegates to the Constitutional Con-
vention would have limited Congress's powers as the most effective
means of creating such protection. The Constitution, however, reflects
an assumption that the federal and state legislatures share substantially
similar interests. Under this view, the principle of federalism described
by the Court in Second Employers' Liability Cases ("[wihen Congress,
in the exertion of the power confided to it by the Constitution [acts], it
[speaks] for all the people and all the States, and thereby establish[es] a
policy for all")'3 9 results from the mutual interests of the state and
L34 368 U.S. 502, 507-14 (1962).
135 448 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1980).
138 See Nowak, supra note 3, at 1440.
137 See Field, supra note 106,;at 541.
138 See Nowak, supra note 3, at 1440-41.
139 Second Employers' Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912).
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federal governments rather than from federal fiat. The Framers of the
Constitution, who represented the states, may have never anticipated a
situation in which Congress would pass legislation authorizing suits
against states for reasons that would not have persuaded a state legisla-
ture to surrender its immunity. x4'
Viewing the Constitution as intended to protect a state's common
law sovereign immunity bolsters Justice Blackmun's argument in Gar-
cia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority that institutional
considerations in the federal system, rather than explicit guarantees in
the text of the Constitution, protect state sovereignty. 141 While it was
thought necessary to restrain the power of the federal judiciary to limit
state sovereignty, the federal legislature, which Madison assured would
"partake sufficiently of the spirit [of States] to be disinclined to invade
the rights of the individual States or the prerogatives of their govern-
ments, ' 1 4 2 was not similarly restrained. The Framers evidently saw no
need to protect a state's sovereign immunity from infringement by the
branch of the federal government considered sensitive to state interests.
The institutional influence accorded to the states in the Constitu-
tion appears calculated to ensure that the federal legislature remains
sympathetic to state concerns. As the Court noted in Garcia:
The Framers thus gave the States a role in the selection of
both the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Federal
Government. The States were vested with indirect influence
over the House of Representatives and the Presidency by
their control of electoral qualifications and their role in pres-
idential elections. U.S. Const., Art. I § 2, and Art. II, § 1.
They were given more direct influence in the Senate, where
each State received equal representation and each Senator
was to be selected by the legislature of his State. Art. I, § 3.
The significance attached to the States' equal representation
in the Senate is underscored by the prohibition of any consti-
tutional amendment divesting a State of equal representation
without the State's consent. Art. V.14
3
In the context of state sovereign immunity, the jurisdictional wall er-
ected by article III and the eleventh amendment added to the list of
constitutional provisions that ensure the institutional influence of the
140 See Nowak, supra note 3, at 1441.
141 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1016-19
(1985).
142 THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 332 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
"4 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1018 (1985).
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states. While subsequent constitutional amendments have diluted the
states' institutional influences,14 4 states' sovereignty was intact at the
time of the Constitutional Convention, and additional factors suggested
that the federal government would not attempt to interfere with the
states' sovereignty. The Constitution was drafted by delegates chosen by
the states, and would initially be interpreted by these same state-se-
lected representatives when they became the first presidents, legislators
and judges of the new republic. The legislative branch, composed of
senators selected by the state legislatures and representatives enjoying
terms sufficiently short to allow frequent reassessment by the electorate,
would not seriously threaten state sovereignty, as evidenced by its reac-
tion to the Chisholm decision. When the federal judiciary managed to
hold a state liable without its consent, the third Congress intervened by
drafting the eleventh amendment, which was then sent to state legisla-
tures for ratification.
D. Congressional Intent to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity:
Sections 1983 and 1988
For many years, the federal government's institutional sensitivity
to state sovereignty protected the states' common law immunity from
congressional interference. Not until after the Civil War and the propo-
sal of the fourteenth amendment did Congress recognize a need to re-
strain state sovereignty explicitly.
145
Even under the broad mandate of the fourteenth amendment, Con-
gress exercised with discretion its power to destroy state sovereignty.
Perhaps the best, example of Congress's restraint is found in the legisla-
tive history of the Civil Rights Acts of 1871, the forerunner of 42
U.S.C. § 1983.46 Whether Congress intended the word "person" in
the statute to include or exclude state governments has been forever lost
due to the passage of time and conflicting interpretations by scholars
and judges predisposed to find support for a particular position. 47 Sec-
tion 1983, however, has been consistently interpreted as not authorizing
144 For example, the seventeenth amendment to the Constitution established the
popular election of senators. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XVII.
141 See Nowak, supra note 3, at 1455, 1456 n.208.
146 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
147 In his concurrence in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979), Justice Brennan
recognized the subjectivity of commentators on section 1983 when he remarked: "The
Court today pronounces its conclusion in dicta by avoiding such evidence. It chooses to
hear, in the eloquent and pointed legislative history of section 1983, only 'silence.' Such
silence is in fact deafening to those who have ears to listen." Id. at 365 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
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suits against a state without the state's consent.14 Although Congress
has amended other laws to allow for suits against a state,149 it has al-
lowed the existing judicial interpretation of section 1983 to stand. 50
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards
Act of 1976, however, is not ambiguous. The Senate report states ex-
plicitly that Congress anticipated the charging of attorney's fees against
state governments:
[D]efendants in these cases are often State or local bodies or
State or local officials. In such cases it is intended that the
attorneys' fees, like other items of costs, will be collected ei-
ther directly from the official, in his official capacity, from
funds of his agency or under his control, or from the State or
local government (whether or not the agency or government
is a named party). 5
In Hutto v. Finney, the Supreme Court held that fee awards could be
made against states in federal court, 5 2 abrogating both the express ju-
risdictional immunity provided by the eleventh amendment and any
common law substantive immunity that survived the ratification of the
Constitution. 53
The abrogation of the state's sovereignty recognized in Hutto binds
the states as if it were accomplished by their own legislatures. Under
Second Employers' Liability Cases,1 " Testa v. Katt55 and the
supremacy clause, the states are obligated to hear claims under section
1988 as if such claims were raised under a state law. 56 When Congress
amended section 1988 to provide for attorney's fees, it intended to
waive the state's immunity to the extent necessary to allow reasonable
attorney's fees for a prevailing plaintiff in a suit under section 1983.
Therefore, a state court confronted with a valid claim for relief under
section 1983 involving an assessment of attorney's fees to be paid out of
the state treasury has no constitutional right to refuse to hear the suit
148 See id. at 341-43.
"9 See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 447-48 (describing the 1972 amendments to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982)).
15I See Nowak, supra note 3, at 1422 n.61 (citing failed legislative attempts to
amend section 1983).
151 S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5908, 5913.
152 437 U.S. 678, 693-700 (1978).
'8 See Wolcher, supra note 94, at 259.
15 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
155 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
158 See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876) ("The laws of the United
States are laws in the several States, and just as much binding on the citizens and
courts thereof as the State laws are.").
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on the grounds that only a state legislature may subject the state to
liability in its own courts.
CONCLUSION
This Comment argues that as long as state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over a federal cause of action, they must enforce the rights
and apply the remedies provided by the federal statute, even if these
rights and remedies conflict with those available under existing state
law. A state court is empowered to provide a forum for section 1983
and state law claims that have been deprived of a common forum by the
Pennhurst decision, and cannot refuse to hear such claims despite the
fact that the court could not award attorney's fees under the state's own
laws. While some state judges may worry that mandatory state court
jurisdiction will cause a deluge of frivolous section 1983 claims brought
solely to create eligibility for fee awards, they cannot address this prob-
lem by closing the courthouse door to section 1983 suits.'x 7
117 State courts are able to deny fee awards in suits predicated on meritless claims.
One state court has observed,
To allow attorney's fees under section 1988 to parties who assert meritless
federal claims along with valid state claims would effectively abrogate the
American Rule [of each party paying its own attorney's fees]. Any person
with a claim founded in state law against a state or its subdivisions would
have every incentive to interject a section 1983 claim into the action, re-
gardless of its validity.
Jackson v. Inhabitants of Searsport, 456 A.2d 852, 856 (Me. 1983). In Jackson the
plaintiff prevailed on the ground that the defendant violated state law by failing to
follow state procedures that did not violate the fourteenth amendment. The court ruled
that the plaintiff's section 1983 claim was therefore insubstantial. For other examples
of state courts refusing to award attorney's fees on the ground that plaintiff's section
1983 claim was insubstantial, see County Executive of Prince George's County v. Doe,
300 Md. 445, 479 A.2d 352 (1984), and Brown v. Hornbeck, 54 Md. App. 404, 458
A.2d 900 (1983).
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